The purpose of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of multimarket contact on the behaviour of pharmaceutical …rms. Firms that meet in several markets may …nd it pro…table tp redistribute market power among markets where they are operating. There are many instances of multimarket contact in the pharmaceutical industry: at the country level, at the therapeutical class or molecule level, and among brand name and generic products. We present evidence for seven OECD countries with di¤erent degrees of regulation and show that regulation a¤ects the importance of economic forces on …rms' price setting behaviour.
Introduction
Multimarket competition is de…ned as 'a situation where …rms compete with each other simultaneously in several markets' (Karnani and Wernerfelt [1985] ). This situation is found in the economy in the form of multiproduct industries or industries with di¤erent geographic markets. The e¤ect of multimarket competition on competition has received little attention. The possibility that multimarket contact could a¤ect competitive outcomes was …rst raised in 1955 by Corwin Edwards, who wrote 'When one large conglomerate enterprise competes with another, the two are likely to encounter each other in a considerable number of markets. The multiplicity of their contact may blunt the edge of their competition'.
Several empirical papers have succeed in testing this hypothesis. For instance, Evans and Kessides [1994] examine empirically the e¤ects of multimarket contact on pricing in the U.S. airline industry. The analysis of the time-series and crosssectional variability of airline fares in the largest U.S. city-pair routes reveals that fares are higher in city-pair markets served by carriers with extensive inter-route contacts. Similarly, Jans and Rosenbaum [1996] and Parker and Röller [1997] estimate tructural models of …rms' behaviour in the cement and the mobile telephone industry respectively and …nd that multimarket contact signi…cantly increases collusion. Finally, Busse (2000) analyses how the existence of multimarket contact may help …rms' coordination in the cellular telephone industry.
This traditional view about the e¤ects of multimarket contact was revised by Bernheim and Whinston [1990] , who analyzed in detail the e¤ects of multimarket contact on …rms' behaviour. In their model, …rms expect to compete over an in…nite number of periods in a set of di¤erent markets and the penalty for deviating from the collusive outcome in any market k is felt in all markets where the deviating …rm meets its market k rivals. These authors show that the existence of this contact may imply that …rms not only increase their power to collude in general terms but they may also …nd it pro…table to design strategic policies and redistribute market power among markets where they are operating, so that total pro…t maximization can be achieved by giving up pro…ts in markets where more collusive outcomes are reachable in order to facilitate collusion and increase pro…ts in more competitive markets.
Accordingly, in presence of multimarket contact, prices can be higher in some markets and lower in some other markets, than they would be in the absence of multimarket contact. In particular, prices will be higher in markets were it is more di¢cult to sustain a tacit collusion equilibrium and lower in markets where it is easier to collude. As we know, easy of collusion depends on a number of factors such as the number of …rms operating in the market, product homogeneity, speed of interaction, cost asymmetries, demand stability, etc. Fernández and Marín(1998) provide empirical evidence from the Spanish hotel industry supporting this result.
The main assumptions for this type of result to hold are the following. First, there is a set of …rms operating in several markets or product lines and some of these …rms meet in more than one market. Second, full collusion is not achievable in at least one market, i.e., any …rm would have incentives to deviate from the fully collusive strategy given the other players strategies. Third, either markets di¤er in some characteristics that a¤ect the outcome of the game, such as the number of competitors and the toughness of competition, or …rms have market speci…c characteristics such as their cost structure. In other words, if the same …rms were competing in identical markets, the equilibrium would not be a¤ected by the existence of multimarket contact. On the other hand, the result is robust to changes in the …rms' choice variable, the shape of the cost and demand functions and the length and toughness of the penalty imposed to deviating …rms.
The theoretical results about competition and multimarket contact can lead to several types of tests and application in the contex of the pharmaceutical markets. As Evans and Kessides [1994] suggest: 'In empirical tests of the multimarket contact hypotheses, appropriate de…nition of the market is of paramount importance.' Pharmaceutical markets are usually bounded in terms of therapeutic classes of drugs, the members of which often are therapeutic substitutes, e.g., antiulcer drugs, antidepres-sants, anticholesterol drugs. etc.
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In addition, within each therapeutic class we …nd a large number of countries which must be regarded as independent markets on the demand side because of di¤erences in their regulatory systems and various barriers to the mobility of drugs. Finally, it is also possible to question if brand name and generic products compete in the same market or constitute two separated markets (targeted towards two distinct groups of consumers). However, the relevant feature of this industry is that, mainly due to its high R&D intensity levels, corporations operating in all these product or geographic markets are broadly the same, so the instances and opportunities for multimarket contact are very numerous.
Accordingly, if multimarket contact plays a signi…cant role in price determination in the pharmaceutical industry, its e¤ect will a¤ect prices in the di¤erent pharmaceutical markets, e.g., therapeutic classes or the like. As a …rst step in our analysis it will be interesting to analyse …rms' behaviour in the context of liberalized pharmaceutical markets and test the signi…cance of multimarket contact variables. If this type of variable turns out to be signi…cant and the behavior described above emerges in the industry, then it will be of great interest to extent the analysis to alternative regulatory regimes and the entry of generic products.
Previous evidence in this industry suggest that marginal costs are almost irrelevant when determining prices and recommend the use of a hedonic price approach. In particular, Berndt et al. (1999) estimate a hedonic price equation that measures the price impact of drugs attributes such as adverse interactions, side e¤ects, dosage, number of indications, etc.
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In addition, in the context of an entry model, Frank and Salkever (1997) include past sales as an explanatory variable, re ‡ecting learning or word of mouth e¤ects (that proxy perceived quality by consumers). This variable could also measure if entry by generics is more or less attractive. Several authors have also accounted for other measures of perceived quality when modelling the pharmaceutical industry. In particular, Scott Morton (2000) concludes that brand advertising directed at the physicians is not a barrier to entry by generic …rms, 3 and King (2000) explains the e¤ect of marketing costs (number of detailing minutes) on product di¤erentiation.
In the context of di¤erent regulatory regimes, Danzon and Chao (2000) identify di¤erent groups of countries depending on strength of regulation. From more to less regulated, the …rst group of countries includes Italy, France and Japan were launch prices are regulated and afterwards are revised downwards over the drug's life cycle, and the price of new varieties is related to the price of established varieties. Consumer and physicians demand are expected to be inelastic due to insurance coverage (physicians could be price elastic in Japan), and generics substitution by pharmacists is allowed neither in France nor in Italy. Moreover, in the latter countries, pharmacies are paid a margin on the product price, which might encourage them to sell more expensive products.
The second group of countries includes UK and Germany were corporations are free to set prices at launch but prices cannot increase later on. In both countries there is some type of upper bound to prices, implemented either through a reference price (Germany) or a maximum overall rate of return (UK). Consumer demand substitution is partially possible only in Germany because of the possibility of multisource drugs. Physicians are price inelastic apart from some UK practicioners. Generics substitution by pharmacists is the main source of price-demand elasticity since they keep the margin between the reimbursement price and the manufacturers price. This is possible in UK, anb to a lesser extent in Germany. The third group of countries includes US and Canada where prices are set freely, consumers' and physicicians' demands are elastic and generic substitution on the side of the pharmacists is encouraged.
The authors estimate a reduced form equation for prices on quality attributes and competition characteristics. Among the former they include variables such as molecule age (to proxy inverse e¢ciency), entry lag (with respect to the launch date of the …rst product in the molecule, to proxy for …rst mover advantages), products age (to proxy for competitive advantage) and the number of di¤erent formulations (as a measure of choice availability). Among the latter, they include the number of generics competitors and the number of molecules in the three-digit therapeutic category. As several authors would argue the number of generics competitors could be endogenous, but it is possible to …nd plausible instruments for it such as the amount of time o¤ patent (see Caves et al. (1991) and Frank and Salkever (1997) ). According to Danzon and Chao, the competition variables should be signi…cant only in unregulated markets. The results show that regulation constraints competition. As mentioned above, it is possible to extend this type of analysis to account for the e¤ects of multimarket contact on competition in order to identify additional e¤ects of regulation on competition. 4 With respect to the e¤ects on price evolution derived from the entry of generic products, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. After entry of generic products, some authors (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992 and 1997 , and Caves, Whinston, Hurwitz, Pakes and Termin, 1991 report that brand-name prices increased relative to generic prices, while others (Wiggins and Maness, 1994) …nd a reduction in prices following entry. Finally, Frank and Salkever (1992 and 1997) report that brand name prices increased while generic products prices fell, producing a reduction in average prices. The latter explain the correlation between brand name prices and generics entry through a Stakelberg price leader model, where brand name producers set prices for their products in the …rst stage and generic product producers set prices only after observing brand name product prices. Demand is formed by two segments: one is price insensitive and the second is price responsive. After the entry of generics price responsive buyers shift to generics and brand name …rms, who are left with price insensitive consumers, decide to raise their prices.
This mixed evidence could also be interpreted in the context of more traditional models of competition were we take into account the existence of multimarket contact and the interaction between brand name and generic products markets. For instance, if ease of collusion is lower in brand name markets and higher in generic products markets, the existence of multimarket contact between the two markets (brand name versus generics) could lead to an increase in brand name product prices following the entry of generic products, while being consistent with a lower average price in the market.
The approach we consider in the paper is the following. Consider a set of …rms that operate and meet in more than one market. Assume that these …rms expect to play an in…nitely repeated game in each market that is determined by the characteristics of the …rms and the market under study (the focal market) and also by the number of contacts and the characteristics of the markets where the contacts take place (the contact markets). Accordingly, we can write the equilibrium value for the choice variable as the result of three multiplicative components, namely its equilibrium value in the stage game, a function of the discount factor, and a function depending on the degree of multimarket contact and the ease of collusion in both the focal and the contact market. To proxy multimarket contact for one speci…c …rm and market, we aggregate the number of contacts that the …rm has in other markets with its competitors in the focal market, giving di¤erent weights to the contact depending on the characteristics of the market where it takes place.
For the empirical test of multimarket contact e¤ects, we use a multicountry and multiproduct data set from the IMS MIDAS international dataset for the period 1998-2003. This dataset encompasses a large number of countries including the top seven in terms of expenditure, as well as medium size and small countries. It also includes a large number of groups or anatomic classi…cation, and allows to study between countries variations, specially in terms of both regulatory regimes and industrial structure.
Provided with this data set, we estimate the e¤ect of multimarket contact on prices using panel data methods. We produce a variety of estimates: product speci…c and country speci…c estimates, and, with a reference purpose, pooled estimates, while controlling for both dynamic and country speci…c e¤ects. We obtain the following results (to be written).
Review of the literature on multimarket contact
It is a well known result that …rms can achieve more collusive outcomes when they expect to meet and compete for an in…nite number of periods. To achieve these outcomes, the …rms involved must design a set of penalties for deviating players. For instance, if a …rm decides to deviate from the collusive outcome, the penalty imposed could consist of reverting for the remainder of the game to the equilibrium strategy for the stage game, since this is also a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated game.
Assume a market where N …rms producing di¤erentiated products compete in prices and denote the equilibrium prices in the one shot game by p ¤ i , i = 1; :::; N. Consider this as the stage game of an in…nitely repeated game. Now …rms have the possibility of choosing a set of alternative prices. Denote by p 0 i the price for …rm i which maximizes the present discounted value of the …rm's expected ‡ow of pro…ts subject to the following incentive constraint
where ¼ Notice that given product heterogeneity the maximum sustainable price, denoted by p + i , is an increasing function of the discount factor, ±. 5 Assuming that …rms set p 
Bernheim and Whinston [1990] generalize this analysis to cases in which …rms meet and compete in more than one market, i.e., there is multimarket contact. The crucial assumption here is that any …rm that breaks the collusive agreement in any market k triggers the penalty in all the markets where it meets its market k rivals. Assuming K di¤erent markets, the incentive constraint becomes
i.e., given that the punishment is going to spread over all the markets, when a …rm decides to deviate from the collusive outcome it does so in all the markets where it operates.
From this expression Bernheim and Whinston [1990] derive several interesting results. First, for identical markets and …rms' characteristics across markets, both pro…ts and losses from deviating are multiplied by the number of markets where the …rms are meeting, and the set of strategies that form subgame perfect equilibria remains unchanged. This is denoted as the irrelevance result.
Second, when markets di¤er or …rms have market speci…c characteristics, we can obtain a larger set of equilibria for each market that still includes all the equilibrium strategies available in absence of multimarket contact. In particular, a …rm can reach more collusive outcomes in some markets by violating condition (1) so long as this condition holds in other markets as a strict inequality, i.e., when p + i > p m i , and condition (2) holds for the whole set of markets where the …rm operates.
Third, …rms can do more than this. Assume that condition (1) holds as an equality for all the markets where the …rm is operating, i.e. in all the markets p + i < p m i . In this case, …rms can reduce their price in some markets so that condition (1) in these market holds now as a strict inequality. By doing so they can increase prices in other markets, violating condition (1), as long as condition (2) still holds. In fact, Bernheim and Whinston [1990] show that …rms may …nd it pro…table to reduce their prices in markets where they achieve more collusive outcomes in order to increase them in other markets with more competition as long as the extra pro…ts from the second set of markets are greater than the pro…ts forgone in the …rst set of markets. This is the most common case since for most demand and cost functions the number of units a¤ected by the change in prices is smaller in the former than in the latter set of markets.
Thus, the existence of multimarket contact not only implies that …rms may increase their power to collude in general terms but also that they may strategically transfer their power to collude from very collusive markets to other markets where collusion is more di¢cult to sustain. Accordingly, we can represent …rm i's equilibrium price in market k as
where ¡(MM C ik ) measures the e¤ect of multimarket contact. According to Bernheim and Whinston's [1990] predictions, we expect to observe ¡(M M C ik ) > 1 in markets with less ease of collusion and ¡(MM C ik ) < 1 in markets with greater ease of collusion.
Data and construction of the variables
We use a multicountry and multiproduct data set from the IMS MIDAS international dataset for the period 1998-2003 6 . This dataset encompasses a large number 6 We dispose of information from the 4 th quarter of each year, apart from 2003, for which the information is provided for the 2 nd quarter.
of countries including the top seven in terms of expenditure, as well as medium size and small countries. It also includes a large number of groups or anatomic classi…cations, and allows to study between countries variations, specially in terms of both regulatory regimes and industrial structure. Many corporations supply drugs in several of these markets that can be de…ned at di¤erent levels of disaggregation.
In the current study we regard a molecule as a market, but it would be desirable to contrast our results using alternative levels of disaggregation. Table 1 presents a list of countries and data summary. All countries are supplied by many corporations that produce and sell several molecules and products. Molecule markets are fairly concentrated since the number of products per molecule ranges from 1.85 (UK) to 4.55 (US) leading to country average and median HHI concentration indexes that range from 0.4 to 0.6. It is clear that this de…nition of the market is too narrow since many of these molecules are close substitutes. Therefore the analysis should be extended to broader market de…nitions. Table 2 presents the distribution of corporations depending on the number of markets supplied for all seven countries in the sample. In all countries more than 60% of the corporations serve more than one market and more than 10% serve more than 15 markets.
The list of variables that we construct is the following. The variable price, called Price, corresponds to sales revenue divided by the number of 'standard units' sold. Accordingly, when several formulations of the product co-exist in the market, this corresponds to a weighted average of the price per standard unit of all these alternative formulations. The variable …rm's size, Fsize, is constructed as total corporation sales (excluding sales of the product under analysis) in each country. Molecule age, Molage, is the time elapsed since the molecule was launched to December 31, 2003. The age distribution of molecules is presented in table 3. New molecules are launched every year in all countries and only between 10% and 20% of the molecules survive after 10 years, showing the high product turnover in the industry. Number of generics, Ngen, is the number of generic products in each market and country. The Hirschmand-Her…ndähl concentration index, HHI-corr, is constructed using corporation sales value, with squared market shares of the corporation under analysis excluded from the index. Finally, we construct the market share of each variety in the market, Mshare, and the aggregate market share of all other varieties supplied by the same corporation in the each market, Cshare. For the regression analysis we use log transformations of Price, Fsize and Molage, so we value more the di¤erences in smaller than in larges values.
Several dummy variables are also constructed: New is a dummy variable equal to one if the product was launched in the previous year and zero otherwise, Censormol equals 1 if the variable was launched before January 1, 1991 and zero otherwise, Censorlag equals one for products launched before January 1, 1991 and one otherwise. As can be seen below, due to potential endogeneity problems for many of these variables we includ one period lagged values in the regressions.
With respect to the multimarket contact variable, an instance of multimarket contact occurs, according to our de…nition, when a corporation i and its competitor j in the focal market k, also meet in a di¤erent market m. If an event of multimarket contact occurs Contact ij;km = 1; otherwise Contact ij;km = 0.
We de…ne the measure of multimarket contact, M MC , as
where Y measures the corporation's interests in that market. We can think to several instances for Y , such as an concentrtion index, the corporation's market share or the percentage of the corporations' operations in that market. The results presented below correspond to a value for Y m = HH I m .
The measure of multimarket contact is the weighted average number of multimarket contacts with the competitors in the focal market which is calculated as follows:
where T C ik is the number of …rm i's competitors in the focal market.
Econometric speci…cation
In the previous section we have shown that in the context of an in…nitely repeated game, the equilibrium price for …rm i in market k, country j and period t, p 0 ikjt , can be represented as a function of its equilibrium price in the stage game, p ¤ ikjt , a mark-up on this price which depends on the discount factor, ± ikjt , and one term depending on the degree of multimarket contact and the ease of collusion in both the focal and the contact market.
Taking all of this into account and assuming linearity we consider the following log-linear speci…cation:
where X ikjt is the vector of variables that potentially a¤ect stage game equilibrium prices, and ® and¯are the parameters of the model. The analysis can be carried out at several levels: cross-country, cross-product and within country.
As pointed out by several authors marginal costs are almost irrelevant in the industry. This suggests the use of a hedonic approach.
have information and therefore we include in our regressions are as follows. Firm's size, Fsize, in order to proxy …rm's brand image that spills over all its products, a dummy variable indicating if the product was launched in the previous year, New, to proxy for entry lag disadvantages, molecule age, Molage, to proxy inverse e¢ciency. Fsize and Molage are included in log form in order to give more weight a di¤erences in small vales than in large values. Moreover, Fsize is constructed as total …rm's sales excluding the product under analysis and it is lagged one period in order to avoid endogeneity problems. In addition, given that Molage is censored in January 1, 1991, we also include a dummy variable that equals 1 if the variable was launched before that date and zero otherwise, named Censolmol. A similar problem arises with the entry date so a second dummy equal to one for products launched before that date and one otherwise, named Censorlag. Notice that other …rms, time or market invariant attributes e¤ects can be accounted for in the model through the panel structure of the data and the use of …xed e¤ects.
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Among the competition variables we include the number of generics, Ngen, and the Hirschmand-Her…ndähl concentration index exluding the squared market share of the product under analysis, HHI-corr. Both variables are potentially endogenous, accordingly the former is lagged one period and the latter is corrected excluding the squared market share of the product under analysis. We also include the market shares of the product under analysis, Mshare, and of other drugs of the same corporation in the market, Cshare, since we would expect that higher sales lead to higher prices. Again both variables could be regarded as endogenous and we lag them one period.
Taking advantage of the panel structure of the data we introduce corporation and time …xed e¤ects to control for unobserved characteristics. We assume that the discount factor component ©(± ikjt ) is accounted by these e¤ects.
For the purpose of this paper, the most important independent variable is the one describing multimarket contact. To proxy this variable, we take every hotel in every market k (the focal market) aggregate the contacts that this hotel has in other markets m (the contact markets) with its market k competitors, given di¤erent weights to the contact depending on the characteristics of the market where it takes place. In particular, we weight each contact by a measure of concentration in the contact market, HHI kjt , because the fewer …rms in the market, the softer the competition and the higher the pro…ts. Given that punishments started in more concentrated markets a¤ect …rms' pro…ts more negatively, …rms care more about these contacts. 9 Then, we aggregate the number of contacts with each competitor from the focal market and divide this value by the number of rival …rms in the focal market, thus providing the …rm's average multimarket contact with its rivals in that market, AVMMC ikjt :
Provided with this measure of multimarket contact and de…ning -(MM C ikjt ) = log ¡(MM C ikjt ), we consider two di¤erent speci…cations for -(M MC ikjt ). Firstly,
which is independent of the characteristics of the focal market. This speci…cation can allow us to test the sign and signi…cance of the e¤ect that the variable measuring multimarket contact has on prices in average terms. A positive and signi…cant sign for°1 would be consistent with the traditional view on multimarket contact, but it could also be measuring the e¤ects of omitted variables highly related to multimarket contact, such as the establishment size or its perceived quality.
Secondly,
where the assumption in (4) is now relaxed allowing for heterogeneity of the multimarket contact e¤ect across markets: The e¤ect of a speci…c contact in market k can be stated as a function of the ease of collusion in the market, measured by HHI kjt , in a way which represents the transfer of market power. We use HH I kjt , which is an instrument for the Her…ndahl index of concentration, to measure ease of collusion since most models of oligopolistic competition forecast that the higher the market concentration, the more collusive the output of the repeated game. Following Gimeno and Woo [1995] , we specify ® kj as
Therefore, we can rewrite (5) as
According to Bernheim and Whinston [1990] , we expect to observe ® 1 > 0, which means that in markets with little capacity of collusion, i.e., low HHI kjt , MM C has a positive e¤ect on prices. This e¤ect has to decrease as the ease of collusion, measured by HHI kjt , increases, i.e., we expect ® 2 < 0. Additionally, we expect ® kj to be equal to zero for a value of H HI kjt between the minimum and the maximum values in our set of observations. Summing up, the e¤ect of multimarket contact is expected to be greater in absolute terms if the variable measuring the ease of collusion in the focal market, HHI k , is among either the largest or the smallest in the sample, being positive in markets with very low values for HH I k and negative in markets with very high values for HHI kjt .
Preliminary results and interpretation
Tables 4 to 6 present the results on running a regression of Log (Price ) on the set of quality and competitoin characteristics as well as multimarket contact variables explained above. In particular, table 4 does not include multimarket contact variables. Its purpose is to show to what extent the remaining values explain prices in the different countries. If we take US as the reference country, we can see that all variables, apart from Ngen and HHI concentration index, are signi…cant and have the expected signs. Firm size, Fsize, is highly signi…cant, indicating that large corporations enjoy higher prices either because its products are of higher quality or perceived as such. Both Molage and Censormol are negative showing that the prices fall with the life-cycle of the molecule and that products associated to molecules launched before January 1991 are cheaper. These variables proxy molecule e¢ciency since new molecules are expected to improve upon previously existing molecules. New is also negative, indicating that new products launched in an eixsting market su¤er from some late entry disadvantage. Consistently, Censorlag is positive, showing that products launched in the market before January 1991 maintain higher prices than those launched later within the same market.
Among the competition variables, the number of generics, Ngen, and the HHI concentration index, HHI-corr, are not signi…cant. Market share of the product and of other corporation's products in the same market are both positive and signi…cant. These two variable are lagged before including them in the regressions for obvious potential endogeneity problems. They could be proxying several things, such as early entry in the market, product or corporation's brand image within the market, or e¢ciency.
The results for Canada, the other unregulated market, are consistent with those for US leaving aside small di¤erences. For instance, the dummy variables Censormol and Censorlag are not signi…cant but HHI-corr, Mshare and Cshare are negative and signi…cant suggesting unintuitive results.
When moving two countries with intermediate levels of regulation, Germany ad UK, the results are broadly consistent with those for Canada. In regulated countries, France, Italy and Japan, the quality variables remain signi…cant and with the expected signs, but there are mixed results with respect to the competition variables. Looking only at the signi…cant variables, in France, Ngen and Mshare have the expected signs, in Japan, HHI-corr, Mshare and Cshare have the expected signs and in Italy none of the signi…cant variables have the expected sign. Table 5 presents the results of the regressions after including the average multimarket contact variable, AVMMC. All other coe¢cients remain fairly stable and AVMMC is positive and signi…cant for Canada and Germany, it is not signi…cant for US and UK, and negative and signi…cant in the three regulated countries, namely, France, Italy and Japan. Table 6 allows for the posibility of a di¤erentiated e¤ect of AVMMC on prices depending on the concentration of the reference market, that proxies ease of collusion.
According to the theory, in presence of multimarket contact, prices are expected to fall in markets where it is easier to reach collusive outcomes whilst they are expected to increase where it is more di¢cult to collude. This means that the coe¢cient for AVMMC, ® 1 , is expected to be positive and the coe¢cient for AVMMC*HHI , ® 2 ,is expected to be negative, with the latter larger in absolute value than the former. The results are strongly consistent with the theory , i.e., both coe¢cients are significant, have the expected signs and j® 2 j > j® 1 j, for Canada, US, and Germany (see …gure 1). In addition, the coe¢cients are weakly consisten, e.g., have the expected signs but either one or both of them are not signi…cant, for UK, France and Japan. Only for the case of Italy the coe¢cients contradict the theory. In addtion, after controlling for these e¤ects, the coe¢cient associated to HHI-corr is either positive (US and Japan) or not signi…cant (all other countries but Italy), apart from the case of Italy, where it remains negative and signi…cant.
As shown in the previous results, the estimation of this preliminary version of the model performs well enough. It is clear that prices are determined according to market rules in more liberalised countries while they behave quite independently of economic variables in more regulated markets. The analysis needs to be extended in several dimensions: broader markets, such as anthomic therapeutical classes, that encompass several molecules, panel data techniques, instrumental variables, .... Some of this extensions will be easily implemented as soon as more data become available to the researchers. 
